It is well known that if investment is irreversible and uncertain, there exists a bene®t to waiting. When such bene®ts are taken into account, the relationship between interest rates and investment may be quite complex. In particular, when net revenues follow a Gaussian random walk, model investment tends to zero at both high and low interest rates. That is, investment is a hump-shaped function of r.
Introduction
Recent developments in the theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty can explain the existence of inertia in a remarkable variety of scenarios, both economic and purely social. In particular, standard Marshallian investment rules have been shown to be sub-optimal because they ignore the bene®t of waiting in an uncertain environment. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide seminal coverage. Given this setting, Section 2 constructs a simple expository framework to help analyse the relationship between interest rates and aggregate investment. It does so by comparing intertemporal expected net present values in a discrete-time model in which a ®rm has a two-period window of opportunity. This approach is of some interest in its own right on two counts. First, it extends the analysis to the Gaussian random walk.
1 Second, tractability is enhanced: the costs and bene®ts of waiting can easily be identi®ed, and there is no need for stochastic/ differential calculus. Section 3 then shows that the effect of interest rates on aggregate investment can be counter intuitive. In particular, model investment tends to zero at both high and low interest rates. That is, investment is a humpshaped function of the interest rate. Model assumptions are then relaxed, and policy implications are discussed. A Coda and Appendix follow.
Model
There are three central elements to such analyses. First, the investment must involve an irreversible expenditure, the size of which is K. This expenditure yields an in®nite sequence of net revenues hR t i. Second, there must be some uncertaintyÐhere net revenues are stochastic, and follow a discrete time random walk R t1 R t " t1 1
where " $ N0;
2 " (Gaussian White Noise). Third, the ®rm can delay its investment. In particular, we consider the case where the ®rm is able to delay investment by a single period of time, of arbitrary length. That is, the ®rm owns a two-period window of opportunity within which it can invest. The decision to invest is thus an intertemporal one: either invest today, or wait one period until tomorrow and then decide again given the new information set. Let I 0 denote the expected net present value of investment today; let I 1 denote the expected net present value of investment tomorrow, given that we only invest tomorrow if it is viable to do so, and given tomorrow's information set; ®nally let I E 1 denote I 1 conditional on today's information set. To emphasise that the results have nothing to do with risk aversion, it is assumed that ®rms are risk neutral. Then, the optimising ®rm should
By contrast, the Marshallian risk neutral ®rm invests today if the project has a positive net present value. That is, it will invest if I 0 > 0. Let future revenues be discounted at a positive rate r, the opportunity cost of riskless capital, set exogenously by policy. Then I 0 and I 1 may be expressed as
is not known at time t. However, the distribution of R t1 is known, and is given by equation (1) as R t1 $ NR t ;
Then there must exist a non-empty set S fR t X R m < R t < R d g within which Marshallian investment rules are strictly sub-optimal: if R t P S, Marshallian rules state`invest today', whereas optimality prescribes waiting one period and then evaluating the problem again given the new information set (as per (2)). The problem of whether or not to wait one period really amounts to evaluating the bene®ts and costs of waiting one period. Referring to Fig. 1 , it seems quite natural to de®ne
More formally, if investment is to take place, waiting is costly because it delays the expected income stream by one time period. An investment today yields an expected income stream with NPV of I 0 . If, however, we wait one period and then make the same investment, we expect to receive the identical income stream, but now delayed by one time period the NPV of which is I 0 =1 r. The bene®t of waiting is that, in doing so, we can avoid potentially poor investments, at least in the light of newly received information. The appropriate investment rule is now Note that rule (5) is formally equivalent to rule (2), since B C if and only if I E 1 I 0 . Also note that the Marshallian risk neutral ®rm will always invest today if the cost of waiting is positive C > 0 iff I 0 > 0. This is just the well-known result that Marshallian investment rules are suboptimal because they only consider the cost of waiting; all bene®ts are ignored. Figure 2 illustrates the bene®ts and costs of waiting. Note that when net revenues R t are small or negative, the bene®t from waiting is large, and the cost small (in fact negative) so that waiting is optimal. Contrariwise, when R t is large, the bene®ts from waiting are small, and the costs large, such that waiting is not viable. As increases, the B curve shifts out and to the right, causing R d to increase. By analogy with option pricing, these results are expected, for as is well known, the value of a call option is an increasing function of .
An explicit algebraic expression for I E 1 can be derived quite easily. 3 To do so, note that eq. (3) implies that
As shown in the appendix, this integral may be expressed as
By providing an explicit form for I E 1 , eq. (6) Ã makes it possible to plot I E 1 with I 0 in real examples.
The hump-shaped relationship
Instead of but one investor, suppose that at any time t, there exists a pool of potential investors. For simplicity, ®rm i's decision to invest is assumed indepencolin rose 629 dent of ®rm j for all i T j: for instance, each investor i may have monopoly rights in geographic area i. As before, all ®rms can make an irreversible expenditure K which yields a stochastic sequence of net revenues hR t i. Equation (1) becomes
2 " and where " now denotes industry-level exogenous shocks. We introduce heterogeneity by allowing different ®rms to have different current revenues R i t , just as empirically, one observes a distribution of returns across an industry. In this vein, let the distribution of R i t across the pool of potential investors be given by GÁ de®ned over 1 ; 2 for 2 > 1 ! 0. 4 We can now contrast two different worlds: a Marshallian world in which ®rms use Marshallian decision rules, and an optimising world in which ®rms take into account the bene®t of waiting. Then, the proportion of ®rms P P 0; 1 investing at time t is given by Several results then follow:
Proposition 1 If investment is irreversible and uncertain, and ®rms behave optimally, then the level of investment is always smaller than Marshallian rules suggest.
As r 3 I investment tends to zero in both worlds.
Proof As r 3 I, R m rK 3 I and thus P m 3 0. Hence P d 3 0 (by Proposition 1). & Proposition 3 As r 3 0 (i) Marshallian investment tends to unity
(ii) Optimal investment tends to zero Propositions 1 and 2 are well known. By contrast, Proposition 3 is somewhat surprising. Its Marshallian component (i) is of course trivial, since as r 3 0, R m 3 0, and thus P m 3 1. To derive the optimising component (ii), it helps to think in terms of the costs and bene®ts of waiting, and to evaluate the limit of these. It is easy to show that as r 3 0, C 3 R t . This is also intuitive: recall that waiting is costly because we delay the expected income stream by one period. If r 0, the future is not discounted, so the cost of waiting one period is just the net revenue forgone in that period which is R t . While the cost of waiting tends to R t (®nite) as r 3 0, the bene®t of waiting tends to in®nity (proof below). Hence, as r 3 0, it always pay to wait and thus investment P d tends to zero. Since R m rK, it is clear that P m is a decreasing function of r, as per standard analysis. By contrast, Propositions 2 and 3 combined suggest that P d is a humpshaped function of r. Figure 3 illustrates this surprising result. In this example, K 2,500, 500 and GÁ is uniform over 0; 1;000. As per Proposition 1, the optimising investment curve always lies below the Marshallian curve.
Explaining the hump intuitively
The right-hand-side of the hump is of course intuitive: as r 3 I, the present value of cash in¯ows tends to zero rendering projects unpro®table. The left-hand-side of the hump is less intuitive, but we do know that it arises formally because the bene®t of waiting tends to in®nity as the discount rate tends to zero (see proof above). Thus, to understand the hump intuitively, all we have to do is explain why B 3 I as r 3 0. In doing so, it helps to think in terms of the distribution of payoffs (denoted by y), instead of the distribution of net revenues. Let y t R t =r À K where R t is known at time t. Similarly, let y t1 R t1 =r À K where R t1 $ NR t ; 2 and thus y t1 $ N y t ; 2 =r 2 . By waiting one period, we censor this distribution of future payoffs, reducing the downside risk while leaving the upside potential y t1 > 0. To make this absolutely clear, we can re-express (3) as follows colin rose 631
Fig. 3. Optimising investment and Marshallian investment
As the variance of y t1 increases, the bene®t of censoring increases: more of the distribution is pushed into the tails, causing the upside potential to increase, but with minimal effect on the downside (see Fig. 4 ). It follows that as r 3 0, this bene®t must tend to in®nity, since y t1 $ N y t ; 2 =r 2 .
Policy implications
If investment is irreversible and uncertain, then the interest-rate effects of policy are complex. One can perhaps imagine embedding the investment hump into the basic IS-LM macro model to give a hump-shaped IS curve which is positively sloped at low rates of interest. In this perverse region, expansionary monetary policy lowers interest rates and output, while expansionary ®scal policy encourages economic activity both directly, and indirectly through higher interest rates. 5 The implications are perhaps reminiscent of the Keynesian liquidity trap, though rather more perverse. At the very least, by Proposition 1, monetary policy is always less effective than Marshallian rules suggest. By contrast, there exist other policy initiatives that are more effective; whereas monetary policy moves one around a given hump contour, policies that reduce uncertainty not only increase the magnitude of the hump, but shift the peak to the left, thus reducing the domain over which the effect of interest rates on investment is perverse. 6 Figure 5 illustrates. As per Fig. 3 , K 2;500 and GÁ is uniform over 0; 1;000.
Generalising the results
We consider six extensions:
(i) The censoring argument above is quite general; it is not distribution speci®c.
(ii) For expository reasons, we assumed the ®rm can delay its investment by one period of time, of arbitrary length. That is, our ®rm had a simple 2-period window 632 the I-r hump (iii) This paper has shown that as r 3 0, B 3 I. This is a suf®cient condition for a hump to exist. However, it is not necessary for B to become in®nite, and this is easy to show:
The most that ®rm i can lose by waiting is its current net revenue R i t , so C i < R i t V i. Since the distribution of potential investors has support R i t P 1 ; 2 , it follows that C i < 2 V i. Thus, if B > 2 , there is zero investment. ;B does not need to grow to in®nity to achieve this result.
For instance, in Fig. 5, 2 1,000 . This important distinction between necessary and suf®cient conditions establishes the framework for extensions (iv) and (v).
(iv) In the usual expository fashion, model investment (once made) was assumed to be in®nitely lived. This generates the 1/r on the RHS of eq. (3), and allows one to neatly prove that B > C, as r 3 0. If investment is ®nitely lived, B and C are both ®nite, so one can no longer claim unambiguously that B is necessarily always larger than C. Nevertheless, as r 3 0, the same censoring principles are at work, striving to produce the same hump-shaped result, and provided the project is suf®ciently long-lived, r will have suf®cient leverage to generate the hump. Note that a project's life does not need to be particularly substantial for colin rose 633 (v) What if our ®rm not only has an option to enter, but also owns an option to exit which it can exercise by paying an exit fee F > 0 if events turn out badly? We then have two intertwined option pricing problems which need to be solved simultaneously. This is a non-trivial exercise that does not permit closed form solutions. Numerical methods are then required, and the end result is then example speci®c. Nevertheless, the essence of such a model is well known from the principles of irreversible investment: corresponding to the Marshallian entry R Is there then a residual bene®t of waiting when ®rms have an option to exit? Yes! An option to exit only guards against outcomes in the Exit Zone (in which case we still make a loss of K F). By contrast, the bene®t of waiting strives to avoid all potentially poor investments: that is, it attempts to avoid both the Loss Zone in Fig. 6 and the Exit Zone (a potential saving of K F).
8 Thus, if a ®rm has an option to exit, its worst case scenario is to lose K F, so that an upper bound on the bene®t of waiting one period is K F=1 r. Thus, in Fig. 2 , as R t 3 ÀI, B will now tend to K F=1 r rather than I, as Fig. 7 illustrates.
Two implications can be drawn: On the one hand, B and C will both be ®nite again, so one can not claim unambiguously that B is always larger than C as r 3 0, just like extension (iv). On the other hand, we know from extension (iii) that B does not need to be in®nite to generate a hump, and therefore neither does F. is always strictly negative. This is because even in the special case of costless exit R Exit m 0, the ®rm will still optimally choose to incur some running losses rather than exiting (since K > 0). 8 Note that an exit option does not necessarily prevent ®rms from making negative losses into perpetuity. After all, in order to exit, the ®rm pays an exit fee F which is itself tantamount to receiving a negative payoff of R t ÀrF into perpetuity. It is not the duration of the loss that is critical, but its net present value. Fig. 6 . Optimal entry and exit any given cost of exit F > 0, hump-shaped relationships will always exist, but will now depend on the example and in particular on , F, and the distribution of R i t across the industry. As F tends to 0, such examples may become special.
(vi) Risk aversion: In our world of risk-neutral agents, the optimising ®rm invested if R t > R d . If agents are now risk-averse, they will require an additional risk premium , so that investment only takes place if R t > R d . Consequently, there will be even less investment than in the risk-neutral case described above.
Coda
This paper adopted a discrete-time continuous state space model to simplify the analysis of irreversible investment under uncertainty. This model showed intuitively that waiting has bene®ts as well as costs. As the bene®ts are nonlinear, the effects of interest rate policy on investment can be complex. In particular, the paper showed that model investment tends to zero at both high and low interest rates. The latter is surprising, and can be explained as follows. By waiting, we censor potentially bad pay-offs, whilst retaining the upside gain. As the interest rate becomes small, the variance of the payoff distribution becomes large, and thus so too must the bene®t of waiting. By contrast, the cost of waiting grows more slowly, so that it eventually pays to wait. Model investment is then a humpshaped function of the interest rate.
Adding an option to exit and/or shortening the length of the income stream reduces this variance and so may dilute the hump-effect. By contrast, the variance increases with the length of a ®rm's option to wait, which will exacerbate the hump. Further, the more risk averse the ®rm, the greater is the premium required to compensate for this variance, which will also accentuate the hump. It remains for the empirical signi®cance of the hump to be tested. This serves as an intriguing colin rose 635 K F 1 r Fig. 7 . The bene®t and cost of waiting (with and without an exit option) topic for future research, especially in view of the important implications such work has for economic policy.
